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REASONABLENESS IN HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT CASES AFTER #METOO
anielle

.

ernstein*

Abstract
The #MeToo movement, a global social response to sexual harassment in the workplace, has turned the traditional approach to
sexual harassment on its head. Instead of shielding perpetrators
and discrediting survivors, employers, the media, and the public
have begun to shift from presuming the credibility of the perpetrator to presuming the credibility of the survivor. But this upending of the status quo has occurred almost entirely in the social
sphere—and the legal system, where survivors of workplace sexual harassment can seek remedies for the abuse they have suffered,
is proving much slower to adapt.
While our social presumptions are flipping to center the behavior
of the accused instead of the accuser, the legal standard for workplace sexual harassment still focuses squarely on the victim’s reasonableness. In order to bring a legally actionable claim of sexual
harassment, a victim must demonstrate that she was objectively
and subjectively reasonable in believing that she was subjected to
sexual harassment. Even if she succeeds in demonstrating this, if
her employer had mechanisms in place to address sexual harassment, she must also demonstrate that her response to her harassment—such as reporting or not reporting the harassment through
an employer’s complaint process—was reasonable.
This Comment analyzes the effects of the #MeToo movement on
federal courts’ definitions of sexual harassment under the existing
legal standard. Since reasonableness is a socially-defined term,
courts have plenty of room to incorporate shifting conceptions of
sexual harassment into their jurisprudence—but many are remarkably slow to do so. While it is too soon to state definitively
* J.D. 2021, University of Michigan Law School. My thanks to Professor Catharine
MacKinnon for encouraging and supervising this research, as well as the exceedingly
patient editors of the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law for their hard work and
support.
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what effect #MeToo will have on sexual harassment law in the
long run, this Comment should leave practitioners and scholars
with a clearer picture of the direction circuit courts have taken
since #MeToo began.

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction s 120
A. The Creation of the Reasonable Victim s 125
B. The Reasonable Victim’s Response to Harassment s 129
II. Reasonableness in Perceiving a Hostile Work Environment
Post-#MeToo s 131
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards s 114
B. The Path Toward Expansion s 137
1. A Hedging Elaboration on Reasonableness s 119
2. Avoidance of the Reasonableness Standard s 124
C. #MeToo Backlash s 125
III. Reasonableness of the Victim in (Not) Reporting
Harassment Under the FARAGHER-ELLERTH Standard s 129
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards s 149
B. The Path Toward Expansion s 134
IV. Conclusion s 154

I. Introduction
In October 2017, the #MeToo movement began to offer what traditional sexual harassment law has not yet provided: a social presumption in favor of victims’ allegations, and, in many cases, a renunciation
1
of the status long afforded to powerful harassers. This seemingly inde1. The social standards for sexual harassment since #MeToo have become much less
deferential to the accused individual. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, #MeToo Changed
Norms, Not the Law, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com
/opinion/articles/2019-11-20/-metoo-changed-sexual-harassment-norms-not-the-law
[https://perma.cc/FZ54-FZEP]. By contrast, in cases just preceding the #MeToo
movement, courts dismissed harassment claims that included sexual references from
coworkers, repeated remarks about plaintiffs’ body parts, and other forms of sexual
propositioning. Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s
Not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html
[https://perma.cc/LE83-
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fatigable movement has not yet lost steam. In addition to pressuring
companies to rid themselves of predators and encouraging men to
reevaluate their past actions, #MeToo has also spurred greater litigation
efforts. For the fiscal year of 2018, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that enforces civil rights laws
against workplace discrimination, including sexual harassment, saw a
13.6% increase in charges alleging sexual harassment and itself filed
50% more lawsuits challenging sexual harassment than in the prior fis3
cal year. Moreover, soon after the #MeToo movement began, polling
showed that the percentage of Americans who stated that they believe
4
that sexual harassment is a serious problem was 64%. Eighty-six per-

PHZB]. While certain lone instances of sexual harassment have made waves in the
news, a lone instance of sexual harassment does not typically meet the severe or pervasive legal standard of a “hostile work environment,” which is the legal classification
for one of the two types of sexual harassment that the Supreme Court has recognized
(the other being “quid pro quo”). CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 105052 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Patrick Dorrian, Boss’s Overheard Sex Talk Not Harassment,
Court Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/bosss-overheardsex-n57982090148/ [https://perma.cc/97CE-JSXX].
2. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came from, and Where It’s Going,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03
/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/ [https://perma.cc/RF6494XR].
3. What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/preventing-workplace-harassment.cfm
[https://perma.cc
/S2EY-LXW5]. For the fiscal year of 2019, the number of charges filed with the
EEOC alleging sexual harassment was comparable to prior years. Charges Alleging
Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/enforcement/chargesalleging-sex-based-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 [https://perma.cc
/5FE6-DSA9]. The EEOC had previously found that many women experience sexual
harassment in the workplace without perceiving it to be such. CHAI R. FELDBLUM &
VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE
CO-CHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE (June 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment
/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/9W8Z-WQDM]. A 2016 report showed that surveys
using probability samples found that only 25% of women experienced “sexual harassment” if given a question incorporating the phrase, but when given more specific
descriptors, such as “unwanted sexual attention,” the incidence rate increased to
60%. Id. Further, when given actual examples of behavior constituting sexual harassment, the incidence rate was as high as 75%. Id. The #MeToo movement may encourage individuals both to bring more claims of sexual harassment and to identify
more instances of sexual harassment for what they are. This, in turn, could encourage
even more legal claims or formal complaints.
4. Joan C. Williams, Jodi Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie Ellis &
Rayna Sharon, What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cas-
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cent of Americans now endorse a zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual
5
harassment in the workplace.
The post-#MeToo definition of sexual harassment—unwelcome or
uninvited sexual behavior in the workplace—may not seem particularly
6
new. But this definition just a year prior allowed then-presidential candidate Donald Trump to minimize his recorded boasting of forcible
7
kissing and groping as “locker-room talk.” Since then, the cultural definition has broadened to encompass a range of conduct, including lewd
comments or suggestive emails—behaviors that had always fit the technical definition of sexual harassment, but which were easier for the pub8
lic to treat as insignificant. Beyond this, the #MeToo movement has
more broadly offered a presumption that an accuser is not operating
under an ulterior motive; a cultural context acknowledging sexual harassment as pervasive in the American (and global) workplace; and a
stricter conception of how sexual harassment should be punished or de9
terred, at least in the public arena.
This shift is evidence of a “norm cascade”—a sea change in what
behaviors are widely considered to constitute sexual harassment and

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

cade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 142 (2019) [hereinafter Williams et al.] (citing
Gary Langer, Unwanted Sexual Advances Not Just a Hollywood, Weinstein Story, Poll
Finds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/unwantedsexual-advances-hollywood-weinstein-story-poll/story?id=50521721 [https://perma.cc
/V8LS-Y42Z]).
Id. at 145; Williams, supra note 1; Chris Jackson, American Attitudes on Sexual Harassment, IPSOS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/npr-sexualharassment-2017-12-14 [https://perma.cc/7YL4-RT89].
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1 (citing The Behaviors Americans Count as Sexual Harassment, BARNA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.barna.com/research/behaviorsamericans-count-as-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/6M4J-372G]).
David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005
/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html [https://perma.cc
/6PDS-HE57].
See, e.g., Debra Birnbaum, CBS Diversity Showcase Director Rick Najera Exits amid
Harassment Allegations, VARIETY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/tv/news
/cbs-diversity-showcase-director-rick-najera-exits-harassment-allegations1202600365/ [https://perma.cc/B6BV-C6Z6] (detailing the ousting of Rick Najera, a
producer at CBS, who resigned after he was accused of making lewd comments to
performers during an annual sketch comedy showcase); Suki Kim, Public-Radio Icon
John Hockenberry Accused of Harassing Female Colleagues, CUT (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/public-radio-icon-john-hockenberry-accused-ofharassment.html [https://perma.cc/BFG8-X7SB] (detailing the retirement of radio
journalist John Hockenberry after investigations into unwelcome overtures to women
employees and bullying behavior toward women of color co-hosts).
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1.

2021] R E A S O N A B L E N E S S I N H O S T I L E W O R K E N V I R O N M E N T C A S E S

123

what might be considered “reasonable” for a victim or an employer to
10
perceive as problematic. But while the court of public opinion has
shifted, whether the courts themselves will shift with it is another matter.
Institutions that previously protected predators in their ranks have
11
increasingly yielded to public pressure to cut ties with those accused.
At present, however, such institutions and individuals may face a greater
threat from public shaming than from litigation. Though public perception of what constitutes sexual harassment may have expanded, the legal
standards governing civil sexual harassment claims can be far more
stringent, offering robust protections for those accused of harassment.
In part, this is a matter of line-drawing in vastly different contexts. The
cultural movement against sexual harassment does not necessitate one
particular outcome for the accused harasser and can operate on a sliding
scale: In response to some behaviors, the public may expect resignations
or firings, and in response to others only explanations or apologies. But
to define a behavior as sexual harassment in legal terms creates legal lia12
bility.
The Supreme Court first recognized the legal claim of workplace
13
sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson in 1986, three
14
decades before the groundswell of #MeToo. In fact, the codification of
10. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998) (empirically establishing the relationship of “norm cascades” with law and society); Williams et al., supra note 4, at
149-54 (describing four new norms post-#MeToo as evidence of a “norm cascade”).
See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-lawlegal-system.html [https://perma.cc/HD5Y-2M5L].
11. Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel
& Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
[https://perma.cc/3VBQ2ESB].
12. Sexual harassment falls within prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259)
(discussed infra Section I.A). See also MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1050-52 (describing legally actionable types of sexual harassment). Of course, such liability is subject to legal defenses, discussed infra Section III.
13. Sexual harassment law can be divided into two distinct types of claims: “quid pro
quo” and hostile work environment harassment. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at
1050-52. The former involves the exchange of sexual favors for advancement in the
workplace; the latter depends on a generally sex-based discriminatory environment.
Id. This Comment will focus only on the hostile work environment form, interchangeably referred to as “workplace sexual harassment.”
14. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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sexual harassment law, through cases like Meritor, could be considered
the prerequisite for this later cultural movement by bringing the issue to
the fore, offering victims of sexual harassment a form of redress, and es15
tablishing a deterrence mechanism for mistreatment in the workplace.
But along with this landmark decision came obstacles for plaintiffs attempting to convince judges and juries that what had happened to them
constituted sexual harassment. One such hurdle is the use of a “reasona16
bleness” standard at two points in the evaluation of a claim. The
standard asks factfinders to determine: 1) Was a victim objectively and
subjectively reasonable in believing that she was subjected to sexual harassment; and 2) if the employer had mechanisms in place to address
sexual harassment, was the victim’s response to her harassment reasona17
18
ble? This standard has left many women—and men —without recourse against workplace harassers. Legal reasonableness has always been
19
defined by and reflective of the existing social status quo. As long as
that status quo is unequal, reasonableness both represents and gives cover to that inequality. The #MeToo movement offers an opportune moment to redefine what constitutes reasonableness in the legal sphere as it
has already done in the public sphere. Courts have already begun to
reckon with how to evaluate this cultural definition of reasonableness
20
amidst an ongoing cultural revolution.

15. See MacKinnon, supra note 2.
16. Note that this court-imposed standard has no basis in the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was instead imported from tort law. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-259).
17. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807 (1998). See infra Section I.B.
18. Men, of course, also experience sexual harassment, but at much lower rates than
women. See, e.g., Michael Alison Chandler, Men Account for Nearly 1 in 5 Complaints
of Workplace Sexual Harassment with the EEOC, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/men-account-for-nearly-1-in-5complaints-of-workplace-sexual-harassment-with-the-eeoc/2018/04/08/4f7a25723372-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html [https://perma.cc/XYE3-NYSC]. Given
those lower rates, the women-centered discourse around #MeToo, and the predominance of women as plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases, this Comment largely focuses on sexual harassment against women.
19. “Legal standards for reasonableness and unwelcomeness . . . themselves refer to social
standards . . . .” Berkeley Talks Transcript: Feminist Legal Scholar Catharine MacKinnon on the Butterfly Politics of #MeToo, BERKELEY NEWS (June 7, 2019),
https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/06/07/berkeley-talks-transcript-catharinemackinnon-metoo-conference/ [https://perma.cc/8FCZ-K6LY].
20. See infra Sections II and III.
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This Comment explores how federal courts are responding to the
cultural shift in perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment. It
begins with background on the existing legal standards in sexual harassment law. Taking those standards in turn, it then catalogues where
federal courts currently stand in their application of those standards
primarily by evaluating summary judgment decisions, as such decisions
reflect courts’ line-drawing with respect to which behaviors can fit the
definition of sexual harassment. While it is too soon to state definitively
what effect #MeToo will have on sexual harassment law, this Comment
should leave practitioners and scholars with a clear picture of the direction circuit courts have taken with regard to sexual harassment law since
21
#MeToo.
A. The Creation of the Reasonable Victim
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal antidiscrimination law barring discrimination in the workplace on the basis
of sex and other protected characteristics, an employee may sue her em22
ployer for workplace sexual harassment. As the Supreme Court decided in Meritor, this includes having to operate in a hostile work environment as long as the conduct creating such an environment is “severe or
23
pervasive.” In 1993, the Court elaborated on this standard, holding in
Harris v. Forklift Systems that “severity or pervasiveness” must be evaluated on the basis of whether a reasonable person would experience the
24
conduct at issue as hostile. Since the conduct in Meritor had been especially egregious—involving repeated rape over three years—in Harris,
the Court went out of its way to clarify that a wide range of behaviors,
not just those rising to the level of sexual assault, could create a hostile

21. Since #MeToo began, there has been some scholarship on its effect on courts and
how the legal standards for sexual harassment law ought to change. See, e.g., Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22 (2018);
Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California as a
Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121 (2018); Sarah David Heydemann & Sharyn Tejani, Legal
Changes Needed to Strengthen the #MeToo Movement, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 69,
237, 249 (2019); Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J.
377, 422 (2019).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).
23. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
24. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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25

work environment. The Court elucidated several factors for whether
the harassment is sufficiently severe, stating that this must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including “the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; . . . whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
26
interferes with an employee’s work performance.” The Court also required as a necessary precondition that the plaintiff herself subjectively
experienced the conduct as hostile—a standard judged separately from
27
the objective test. Since Harris, the Court has also made it clear that an
isolated incident will not rise to the level of egregiousness required by
28
the severe or pervasive standard.

25. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
26. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. Note that the Court embedded yet another reasonableness
standard into this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis with respect to work performance interference. Id. at 22.
27. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Otherwise, per the Court, “the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation.” Id. This paper does not address the subjective standard, but it is worth considering whether courts’ analysis of the subjective reasonableness of the plaintiff may
change over time. Even in a situation in which a plaintiff meets the objective reasonableness standard, her subjective perceptions could theoretically sink her case. In one
pre-Harris case, for example, a district court held that a plaintiff “lacked credibility
when she testified that she was offended by” pornographic materials distributed
around her office since she had previously taken nude photographs. Burns v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992). Though the Eighth
Circuit reversed and the opinion preceded the objective and subjective reasonableness
tests, its analysis suggests that under those tests the district court would have found
for the employer given the judge’s perception of the plaintiff’s subjective response to
the harassment she faced. Id.
28. The Supreme Court has held that “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)”
should not be considered a form of sexual harassment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). See also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S.
268, 271 (2001). The severity of that single or isolated incident apparently must be
quite extreme: An influential Ninth Circuit case decided by former Judge Alex
Kozinski, who himself has been credibly accused of sexual harassment, held that a
coworker’s groping of the plaintiff’s breasts—something that led to his criminal conviction for sexual assault—did not qualify as severe or pervasive enough to constitute
sexual harassment. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2000);
Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harassment
Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us
/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/5Y8W-8VKW]. Some deem this the
“one free grab” or “single grope rule” case. See generally Williams et al., supra note 4;
Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 21. Some scholars argue that an “overly stringent
judicial application of the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard may have resulted from outlier decisions in early harassment jurisprudence, written by overwhelmingly older male
judges hostile to harassment claims,” or are simply a misinterpretation of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo
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Circuit courts remain split as to whether the objective prong
should take into account the plaintiff’s gender. In 1998, in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, the Court suggested in dictum that the objective reasonableness standard be modified to “a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position,” though it did not expressly adopt such a standard
29
as its holding. Today, despite Oncale, there is still substantial debate
over whether the standard should consist of a reasonable person, reasonable woman, or some other version of reasonableness that more explicitly takes into account the victim’s characteristics. The majority of circuits
that have decided this issue have either rejected gender specificity or
maintained a reasonable person standard without addressing the issue of
30
incorporating gender into the reasonableness analysis.
In contrast, the Third and Ninth Circuits use a standard that explicitly incorporates the plaintiff’s gender. The Ninth Circuit first estab31
lished a “reasonable victim standard” in Ellison v. Brady. The Ellison

Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 241 (2018) (citing SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA
A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL 37 (David Kairys ed., 2017)); Judith J. Johnson, License to
Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV.
85, 86 (2003).
29. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (emphasis
added).
30. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected the reasonable woman standard. DeAngelis v.
El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The test is
an objective one, not a standard of offense to a ‘reasonable woman.’”). The Sixth Circuit has also explicitly rejected the standard. Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767,
776 (6th Cir. 1996) (adopting Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Mich.
1993) (holding that “a gender-conscious standard must be rejected”)). The Eighth
Circuit previously applied a reasonable woman standard but then rejected the standard after Harris. Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 1996).
The remaining circuits apply a gender-neutral reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir. 2006); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 269 (4th Cir. 2006); Whittaker v. N. Ill.
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213,
1219 (10th Cir. 2003); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.
1997). The Second Circuit previously weighed applying a reasonable woman standard, but ultimately side-stepped the issue. Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 22122 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e need not choose between these two options because we
conclude that the evidence in this case . . . would permit a jury to conclude that a reasonable person, regardless of gender,” would deem the environment hostile.). For
more on this issue, see Blair Druhan, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis of Who, What,
and Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 355,
362-63 (2013) and Nicole Newman, The Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference?, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 529, 532-33 (2007). The Supreme Court has not
commented on the matter since Oncale.
31. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
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analysis considers whether “a reasonable victim of the same sex as the
plaintiff would consider the comments [or actions] sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create an abusive
32
working environment.” Similarly, the Third Circuit has applied a
33
standard of a “reasonable person of the same sex in that position.”
If courts were to adopt the Oncale dicta measuring objectivity in
terms of “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,” sexual harassment law could adapt much faster to the changing societal demands of
the moment. There is an intersectional evaluation implicit in the Oncale
approach, rendering it sensitive to inequality: “The plaintiff’s position”
naturally includes her race, gender, past experiences of sexual harassment—which could exacerbate perceptions of or the harm experienced
34
from a hostile work environment—and more. In the meantime, the
application of different reasonableness standards creates dissimilitude in
35
how plaintiffs are treated across circuits.

32. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (“A complete understanding of the victim’s view requires,
among other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women.
Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women.”). This
holding can be traced to Judge Damon Keith’s dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co., in which the Sixth Circuit established a traditional reasonable person standard.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refin. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Keith argued that “the reasonable person perspective fails to account for
the wide divergence between most women’s views of appropriate sexual conduct and
those of men.” Id. Similarly, two influential pre-Oncale decisions reflect how courts
can apply reasonableness standards that take into account the victim’s unique position. In Hicks v. Gates Rubber, the Tenth Circuit determined that “[aggregating] evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility” was permissible to determine whether the plaintiff, a Black woman, was subjected to a hostile work
environment. Hicks v. Gates Rubber, 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987). In
Anthony v. County of Sacramento, where the plaintiff was a Black woman, the Eastern
District of California maintained that “objective hostility is determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics as [the]
plaintiff,” therefore analyzing how “a reasonable African-American woman” would
have assessed the conduct alleged. Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 898 F. Supp.
1435, 1447 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
33. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
34. For more on this issue, see, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1 at 1063-74; Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo
Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 109 (2018) (advocating for a “standard based on a
reasonable person in the complainant’s intersectional and multidimensional shoes”);
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445,
464-71 (1997); Catharine MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, 31
NOVA L. REV. 2, 5 (2007) (arguing that “usually, it is perpetrators who have to be
reasonable”).
35. See Newman, supra note 30, at 552-55.
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Before #MeToo—and in some circuit courts, after it—the standard
for deeming workplace behaviors sexual harassment could be almost insurmountable for plaintiffs alleging less overtly outrageous offenses than
what occurred in Meritor, even as courts applied the Harris factors.
Courts across all circuits have dismissed cases involving allegations of
unwelcome sexual advances or even battery from a harasser as not suffi36
ciently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Despite the range of behaviors Harris provides for, pre-#MeToo courts often required plaintiffs to
have suffered the most egregious or cruel forms of harassing behavior in
order to have a legally actionable claim. Only then could victims of sexual harassment be confident they might be found “reasonable.”
B. The Reasonable Victim’s Response to Harassment
If a plaintiff is successful in arguing that she was the victim of
workplace sexual harassment, employers may still escape liability
through a second reasonableness test. Two companion cases from 1998
established a reasonableness standard for both employers and plaintiffs
in handling the aftermath of sexual harassment in the workplace. Taken
together, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth created what is colloquially known as the Faragher-Ellerth defense: If there has been no tangible, adverse employment action against
37
the plaintiff, such as a demotion or firing, employers may raise the
two-prong affirmative defense that 1) they exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct the harassing behavior, and 2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities the employ36. See, e.g., Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102-03
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding that explicit, unwelcome sexual advances were not severe or
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203
F.3d 980, 981, 984-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a single instance of battery, as
well as multiple comments from the harasser to the plaintiff such as “Since you have
lost your cherry, here’s one to replace the one you lost” when handing her a cough
drop, did not create a hostile work environment); Mormol v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s manager’s repeated
request for sex was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(finding that supervisor’s constant following of the plaintiff, staring at her groin and
rubbing against her did not constitute actionable harassment); Brooks v. City of San
Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a groping that resulted in a
criminal conviction did not create a hostile work environment).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). Often, a tangible adverse
employment action can support an employee’s case that she was harassed or discriminated against. Id.
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38

er provided. Yet again, the plaintiff is subjected to a purportedly objective reasonableness test, and another obstacle to making her case.

The #MeToo movement has created an atmosphere in which
courts can reevaluate a plaintiff’s reasonableness with respect to the perception of a hostile work environment and with respect to her response
to that environment. This is because reasonableness is socially defined.
In other words, to determine what a reasonable person would do, courts
and juries necessarily impose a societal standard for what constitutes rea39
sonableness, which typically reflects the status quo. Now, a handful of
post-#MeToo court decisions offer a snapshot of where courts may be
headed in a society that has begun to reckon with its past expectations
40
for and treatment of targets of sexual harassment. This development

38. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).
39. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014). This of
course reflects the perennial question of whether culture drives law or vice versa (or
perhaps whether both influence one another). Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, evaluating the effect of racial justice activism on courts, argue that social movements have
had “a decisive effect” on giving “heft and constitutional value” to legal changes. Id.
at 2743. In their view, those seeking social change “cannot simply rely on judicial decisions as the solution” but instead must “integrate lawyers not as leaders but as fellow advocates” to create “a new paradigm” of “demosprudence”: democratic efforts
that legitimize lasting legal change, not the equivalent of a great man theory for individual judicial victories. Id. at 2749. For more on how the legal and cultural aspects
are intertwined, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002). Given
the influence social activism can have on judicial approaches, the fact that the #MeToo movement arose in part out of social media may expedite its effects on the legal
system, as victims of sexual harassment were able to congregate under a hashtag, amplifying one another’s stories in a way that would have been near-impossible before
the internet age. See generally Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s
Power to Transform Law, 105 KY. L.J. 413 (2016). For more on the effect of the internet on social movements and legal advocacy, see id.
40. Notably, as seen in the cases cited in Sections II.A-C and III, most of the decisions
evaluating reasonableness since #MeToo involve litigation that began prior to the inception of the movement in October 2017. E.g., Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’n
Dist., 718 F. App’x 264 (5th Cir. 2018). If more cases arising from post-#MeToo
understandings of sexual harassment are brought, an influx of cases involving single
incidents or incidents not previously considered severe may encourage courts to
reevaluate reasonableness as well—but not enough time has passed to track the spillover from the #MeToo movement into the types of claims being pursued through the
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raises the question: If the creation of workplace sexual harassment law
was a precondition for the #MeToo movement, could the movement be
a precondition for broadening the legal definition of sexual harass41
ment?
II. Reasonableness in Perceiving a Hostile Work Environment
Post-#MeToo
In the three years since the #MeToo movement took off, federal
courts have primarily only hinted at how their application of the reason42
ableness standard might change. As of yet, no court has commented
43
expressly on the influence of #MeToo on the reasonableness test. It
may be too soon to tell definitively the direction that courts are moving
in with respect to this standard, but some cases offer insight.
Though the majority of courts purport to apply a gender-neutral
model for reasonableness, the type of reasonableness standard courts apply does not necessarily appear to have an outcome-determinative ef44
fect. Notably, the courts that apply a gendered model, the Third and
Ninth Circuits, have not re-assessed the hostile work environment rea45
sonableness standard since #MeToo began. Courts applying the gender-neutral standard post-#MeToo fall on a spectrum of favorable to

41.

42.
43.
44.

45.

legal system. There are also a number of other elements of sex discrimination law that
the #MeToo movement stands to affect, including other prongs of hostile work environment evaluations, educational sexual harassment claims arising under Title IX,
and more.
See MacKinnon, supra note 2. Note that, to date, litigators have not made explicit
#MeToo arguments in new briefs or complaints with respect to reasonableness,
though the movement has come up in passing on some complaints. Docket Search
Results for “#MeToo,” “#MeToo Movement,” “Me Too,” and “Me Too Movement,” BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com (in Bloomberg Law, search
starting point field for “#MeToo,” “Me Too,” “Me Too Movement,” and “#MeToo
Movement” within the date range of 10/01/2017 to 03/05/2021; then narrow to federal courts and the categories “Civil Rights: Employment” and “Civil Rights: Other;”
yielding seventy-seven results) (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
See infra Sections II.A-C.
See, e.g., all cases cited infra Section II.A-C. None of the opinions in these cases expressly mention #MeToo in their discussions of reasonableness.
Limited research into the effects of applying gender, or not, suggest there is no particular trend of success for plaintiffs depending on the standard used. See Newman,
supra note 30, at 552-55 (tracking rates of plaintiff success in establishing a claim).
Citing References to 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com
(in Westlaw, search within “Citing References” of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2; narrow to
“Cases”; narrow to Third and Ninth Circuits, and search “hostile work environment”; yielding 188 case results) (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
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unfavorable for plaintiffs; as others have noted, “Courts across the country lack a reliable metric for uniformly analyzing which conduct rises to
46
[the] level of ‘severe or pervasive.’”
While several circuits have weighed in on this issue, decisions from
the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits best represent the varying approaches to reasonableness today. The Fifth Circuit offers a continuation of the same application of the reasonableness standard that applied
pre-#MeToo, while the Fourth and Seventh Circuits represent opposite
ends of the spectrum: The Fourth Circuit has expanded its definition of
reasonableness without commenting on the influence of #MeToo, while
the Seventh Circuit has almost engaged in a backlash against the chang47
ing social standards for appropriate workplace behavior. To make matters more confusing, the EEOC—whose decisions courts and employers
can look to when attempting to evaluate or create workplace standards—has been inconsistent in its own jurisprudence, falling all over this
48
spectrum. Since the EEOC is one of many bodies that have been slow
to adjust its reasonableness analysis and address the elephant in the
room that is #MeToo, litigants are left uncertain of how, if at all, changing social norms will affect the legal standards to which their claims are
held. An examination of summary judgment decisions shows how insular courts can be relative to the cultural movement, as in some cases
courts can even be hostile to potentially meritorious claims.
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards
Given the societal evolution stemming from #MeToo and the elasticity of a reasonableness standard, a court that maintains the status quo
of reasonableness—one in which only the most egregious or repetitive
behaviors rise to the level of a hostile work environment—is effectively
making a statement against the turning tides outside the courtroom.
Ironically, courts that maintain narrow conceptions of reasonableness
have invoked Oncale’s reminder that Title VII is not a “general civility
code” despite the flexibility Oncale actually discussed extending to the
49
reasonableness evaluation.

46. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 21, at 81.
47. See infra Section II.C.
48. EEOC decisions demonstrating this are discussed infra in each section. Note that the
Supreme Court has held that the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII should be given
“great deference” and that courts should look to its decisions for guidance. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
49. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
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The preexisting standard that a single incident does not typically
rise to the level of severity—and certainly not pervasiveness—required
to create a hostile work environment quite clearly informs many post#MeToo decisions that continue to adhere to status-quo conceptions of
50
reasonableness. Take, for instance, an EEOC administrative decision
51
from March 2018. A technician for the Social Security Administration
in Tulsa, Oklahoma alleged that an administrative law judge sexually
harassed her by hitting her bottom with his cane and later referring to
her as “Pocahontas,” leading the complainant to raise sexual and race
52
harassment claims. The EEOC held that the singular instance of
touching was not “so severe or pervasive . . . that a reasonable person
53
would consider the conduct hostile.” Calling the incident “inappropriate,” the EEOC reiterated the standard that “[n]ot every unpleasant or
undesirable act which occurs in the workplace constitutes a discrimina54
tion violation.” But even repeated incidents that are more physical in
nature may still not rise to the EEOC’s interpretation of the reasonable
person standard. In one case in February 2019, the EEOC held that a
man’s allegation of sexual harassment by his woman supervisor—
including three separate occasions during which she attempted to rub
55
and massage him—did not meet the “reasonable person” standard.
When a single incident involves a more explicitly physical altercation, the EEOC has deemed it severe enough for a reasonable person to
perceive a hostile work environment. For instance, in Taryn S. v.
O’Rourke, a medical support assistant alleged that a physician hugged
her, forcibly grabbed her neck, kissed her, grabbed the belt loops of her
56
pants, and persistently told her he wanted to have sex with her.
Though the Department of Veterans Affairs’ agency review deemed this
an isolated incident that a reasonable person would not find created a

50. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (noting “isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious)” should not be considered a form of sexual harassment).
51. Marielle L., EEOC Appeal No. 0120162299, 2018 WL 1737437, at *1 (Mar. 29,
2018).
52. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *1. The complainant was “both Caucasian and
Native American”; the EEOC made no decision with respect to the race discrimination claim because, it stated, there was not enough evidence that the remark was
made in the first place. Id. at *5-6.
53. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *2.
54. Marielle L., 2018 WL 1737437, at *6.
55. Monroe M., EEOC Appeal No. 0120172219, 2019 WL 1397601, at *1, *4-5 (Feb.
28, 2019).
56. Taryn S., EEOC Appeal No. 0120162172, 2018 WL 4692613, at *1-2 (Sept. 14,
2018).
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hostile work environment, the EEOC, without much elaboration, disagreed, stating only that in “certain circumstances” a single incident
57
could be severe enough to create a hostile work environment. The
EEOC also looked to the complainant’s subjective reasonableness, noting that she was “embarrassed, humiliated, and nervous” as a result of
58
the incident.
This same reasoning persists in circuit courts. In Malin v. Orleans
Parish Communications District, the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable
person would not believe that six interactions in which a woman human
resources manager graphically described sexual encounters to the woman plaintiff—despite her protestations—met the severe or pervasive
59
threshold. Though the court referred to the commentary as “unprofessional, unwelcome and distasteful,” it emphasized Oncale dicta that “Ti60
tle VII is not a ‘general civility code.’”
Though courts do not necessarily misconstrue sexual harassment
precedents by foreclosing relief for single incident claims, doing so at the
summary judgment stage can demonstrate courts’ hostility to potentially
meritorious claims. When judges grant summary judgment to defendants in sexual harassment cases, they foreclose the jury’s ability to find
the hostile work environment claim reasonable in favor of their own determination that it is not. By preventing juries from weighing in on the
reasonableness question, judges engage in line-drawing that may be out
of step with today’s cultural climate, cutting many plaintiffs off from relief that a post-#MeToo jury with its own conception of reasonableness
might otherwise grant. By 2020, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits followed
the same path as the Fifth Circuit, allowing summary judgment decisions for defendants to stand in hostile work environment cases—taking
it out of the jury’s hands—despite the potential for a trier of fact to find

57. Taryn S., 2018 WL 4692613, at *9.
58. Taryn S., 2018 WL 4692613, at *9.
59. Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’ns Dist., 718 F. App’x 264, 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2018).
Malin involved a retaliation claim, but the Oncale standard still applies to determine
whether the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when reporting the incidents. Id.
at 272. The Malin court noted that in order to establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must prove she reasonably believed the conduct she reported was an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII—again, the elusive reasonableness standard. Id.
(citing Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000)).
60. Malin, 718 F. App’x at 273 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S.
at 81 (1998)). The court did not comment on the shared gender of the women apart
from an indirect reference to the “innocuous differences in the ways men and women
routinely interact with members of the same sex.” Id.
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61

a valid claim. In McDaniel v. Wilkie, Natalie A. McDaniel, a Black
woman employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleged that
she was subjected to “inappropriate touching, comments, subjective
evaluations, workplace sabotage, false accusations of misconduct, failure
to promote, failure to grant her reasonable accommodation[,] and the
62
removal of the assets/tools necessary for her to perform her job.” More
specifically, she alleged that, among other transgressions, supervisors inappropriately asked whether women employees were in relationships
with other women employees; “stroked her hair”; and called her a
63
“bitch.” The Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment to the defendants because “[e]ven viewed in the best
light for her case, the events that McDaniel alleged [did] not show an
64
environment ‘that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,’”
65
emphasizing from Supreme Court precedents that “simple teasing,”
“‘offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)
66
will not amount to’ a hostile work environment.” But a court could
choose to treat these repeated incidents as pervasive, in particular when
the case is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff at summary judgment, and allow the facts to come before a jury to make its
67
own determination. In other words, especially in light of the #MeToo
movement, a reasonable person could perceive these same behaviors as
not isolated and more than simple teasing, characterizing them as sexual

61. Courts review appeals of summary judgment decisions de novo. See, e.g., Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465 n.10 (1992) (“[O]n summary judgment we may examine the record de novo without relying on the lower
courts’ understanding . . . .”). When resolving summary judgment motions, courts
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g.,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(“[O]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . .
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” (citation omitted)).
62. McDaniel v. Wilkie, No. 19-3304, 2020 WL 1066007, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31,
2020) (quotation marks omitted).
63. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *1.
64. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
65. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82).
66. McDaniel, 2020 WL 1066007, at *3 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. at 775, 787 (1998)) (citations omitted).
67. Certainly, the #MeToo movement has led to the treatment of these types of behaviors as forms of sexual harassment. See Birnbaum, supra note 8; Kim, supra note 8.
But courts have contributed to this reform as well. See, e.g., Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding the spread of a single
rumor was a sufficient incident to meet the hostile work environment standard).

michigan journal of gender

136

& law

[Vol. 28:119

68

harassment. Therefore, it is equally—perhaps more—plausible that
these facts meet the hostile work environment standard and the claim
should survive summary judgment to allow a jury to determine reasonableness.
The Eighth Circuit even admitted as much, openly acknowledging
the problematic behavior of a particular defendant while still deeming
his behavior to be insufficient to survive a motion for summary judg69
ment. Jennifer Paskert, a sales associate at a used car dealership,
brought a hostile work environment suit against her employer due to
70
her supervisor Brent Burns’s treatment of her and other women. According to the evidence provided, Burns was, in the Eighth Circuit’s
words, “volatile” and “frequently lost his temper with everyone”; he
would “[use] derogatory names” for “female customers”; and his “treat71
ment of women was demeaning, sexually suggestive, and improper.”
More than one person testified to having heard Burns remark that he
“‘never should have hired a woman’ and wonder aloud if he could make
72
Paskert cry.” Burns also “openly bragged at work about his purported
73
sexual conquests.” On one occasion, another employee “witnessed
Burns attempt to rub Paskert’s shoulders and say he was going to give
74
her a hug.” One time, after Paskert criticized Burns’ treatment of her,
he replied, “Oh, if you weren’t married and I wasn’t married, I could
75
have you . . . You’d be mine . . . I’m a closer.”
The court showed clear distaste for Burns’s conduct, calling it “cer76
tainly reprehensible and improper.” Despite this, the court held
Burns’s conduct was still “not so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms
77
and conditions of Paskert’s employment.” In part, this was because
“Paskert only allege[d] one instance of unwelcome physical con-

68. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 8 (detailing the ousting of Rick Najera, a producer at
CBS, who resigned after he was accused of making lewd comments to performers
during an annual sketch comedy showcase); Kim, supra note 8 (detailing the retirement of radio journalist John Hockenberry after investigations into unwelcome overtures to women employees and bullying behavior toward women of color co-hosts);
Carlsen et al., supra note 11 (detailing the range of behaviors that led to the firing or
resignations of 201 men after #MeToo began).
69. Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 539 (8th Cir. 2020).
70. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
71. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
72. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
73. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
74. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
75. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 537.
76. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
77. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
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78

tact . . . .” Of course, nothing in Harris or Oncale limits the definition
79
of sexual harassment to physical contact. While the court did not
mince words in stating that the defendants—both the company and
Burns himself—”should both be embarrassed and ashamed” of their
treatment of Paskert, it nonetheless stood firm that this behavior could
80
not meet the severe or pervasive standard.
B. The Path Toward Expansion
While the pre-#MeToo approach to reasonableness is alive and well
in some circuits, there is reason to believe that the tides are turning in
others. No court has yet overtly made reference to the #MeToo movement in its reasonableness analysis, but reading between the lines of
their decisions, there are hints that the movement-led cultural shift has
influenced that analysis. While we are, as of yet, unable to empirically
tie these courts’ willingness to uphold hostile work environment claims
directly to the #MeToo movement, some courts’ treatment of less severe
instances of harassment or less frequent harassing behaviors as legally
cognizable is nonetheless in step with the movement’s cultural treatment
of those same behaviors. In particular, by allowing the reasonableness
evaluation to better incorporate the harm a plaintiff has suffered—that
is, by allowing the effects of sexual harassment to support a finding that
it occurred—courts offer a path for more plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence
under the existing legal standard.
1. A Hedging Elaboration on Reasonableness
The Fourth Circuit has come the furthest in expanding its definition of reasonableness since #MeToo began. As early as January 2018—
mere months after #MeToo got underway—the Fourth Circuit reversed
a district court’s order granting summary judgment to an employer on a
81
hostile work environment claim in Hernandez v. Fairfax County.
Magaly Hernandez, a firefighter, experienced regular harassment from
her station captain including inappropriate touching, his use of his body
to block her path, telling her he wanted to see her in a bathing suit,

78. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 538.
79. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
80. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 539.
81. Hernandez v. Fairfax County, 719 F. App’x 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2018).
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“and once [asking] Hernandez whether she would ‘be able to handle
82
that big hose,’” which she understood to be a sexual innuendo.
Though the station captain adjusted his behavior after Hernandez reported his conduct to the station’s battalion chief, the station captain
83
then began monitoring and tracking Hernandez’s movements at work.
Nonetheless, the district court held that the conduct “was not sufficient84
ly severe or pervasive” under the objective reasonable person standard.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and held that the facts could
support a jury determination that Hernandez was subjected to a hostile
work environment, particularly in light of the duration of the harass85
ment and the physical invasion of Hernandez’s space. Despite applying
the same standards that led the Eighth Circuit to reject a similar sexual
harassment claim in Paskert, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
conduct at issue could reasonably meet the standard for a hostile work
86
environment.
More than a year later, in February 2019, the Fourth Circuit again
reversed a district court’s decision in favor of an employer and expanded
its interpretation of reasonableness in Parker v. Reema Consulting Ser87
vices. Evangeline Parker, a manager in a warehouse facility, alleged that
male employees were circulating a rumor that she was promoted due to
88
a sexual relationship with a higher-ranking manager. Parker alleged
that she was generally treated with disrespect as a result, including being
89
locked out of an all-staff meeting at which the rumor was discussed.
The Fourth Circuit did not expressly comment on the objective and
90
subjective reasonableness standards when offering its holding. However, in holding that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable, it noted that “the harassment was continuous,
preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees
at the . . . facility for the entire time of Parker’s employment after her

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 186.
Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 186.
Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187.
Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187-88.
Hernandez, 719 F. App’x at 187-88; Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950
F.3d 535, 537-39 (8th Cir. 2020).
Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2019). The
lower court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. In addition to holding
that the harassment was not severe or pervasive, the lower court held that the harassment was not based on sex, which the Fourth Circuit also reversed. Id. at 301.
Parker, 915 F.3d at 300.
Parker, 915 F.3d at 300.
See Parker, 915 F.3d. 297.
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91

final promotion.” The Fourth Circuit went so far as to call the con92
duct against Parker “humiliating.” By implication, Parker was subjectively reasonable, and the impact on the greater office indicated that the
93
workplace environment was objectively hostile as well.
Contrast this with the Eighth Circuit’s approach in Paskert, in
which the court upheld a summary judgment holding for a defendant
94
while condemning his behavior as “reprehensible and improper.”
There, the Eighth Circuit denounced behavior as a matter of social mores, but took pains to maintain a legal standard that allowed, by its own
description, harm to the plaintiff. But if in the context of social mores, a
reasonable person could—and did—deem this behavior “reprehensible
and improper,” what separates that behavior from harassing behavior
that is severe or pervasive? The court effectively admitted that this behavior was sexually harassing but nonetheless chose to adhere to an outdated formula for determining hostile work environments for no obvious reason other than custom. Unlike in the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit’s framing of the alleged behavior as “humiliating”—effectively
synonymous with “reprehensible and improper”—gave the court room
to account for the harm caused to the plaintiff as part of its reasonableness analysis. Harris and Oncale require that courts focus on the plaintiff’s perspective, yet the reasonableness standard has been shown to be
fungible enough that “humiliating” treatment has led to completely different outcomes.
In a case with a similar pattern of harassment to the one the Fourth
Circuit addressed in Parker, the Sixth Circuit recently reversed a summary judgment finding for a defendant employer based on similar rea95
soning. In Harper v. Elder, Wendy Harper, an employee at a jail, alleged that her coworker Brad Conaway sexually harassed her and that
her boss retaliated against her for reporting Conaway’s misconduct to
96
him. Harper alleged that Conaway “asked about her romantic availability, complimented her physical appearance, and made overt sexual

91. Parker, 915 F.3d at 304.
92. Parker, 915 F.3d at 305.
93. The case also involved a retaliation claim, which requires the plaintiff to be “objectively reasonable” in believing she was subjected to gender discrimination at the time
she files a complaint. Parker, 915 F.3d at 300. Since the Fourth Circuit upheld her
claim, by implication, Parker was objectively reasonable in perceiving a hostile work
environment. Id.
94. Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2020).
95. Harper v. Elder, 803 F. App’x 853, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2020).
96. Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
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97

advances.” When Harper rejected Conaway, he “frequently yelled at
her” in front of her colleagues, “ordered her around,” and at one point
“intentionally drove his pickup truck in her direction as they left work,
98
coming within inches of hitting [her].” When Conaway was promoted, he “routinely selected Harper over her male colleagues for menial
tasks,” and, due to Conaway’s repeated harassment, Harper ultimately
99
left her job. The district court held that her allegations did not meet
the severe or pervasive standard and granted summary judgment to the
100
defendant.
The circuit court reversed, holding that the conduct Harper described “could make a reasonable person in Harper’s position feel that
her workplace is hostile,” in particular noting that Harper called the
harassment “a daily thing” and that there was “a years-long ‘succession
101
of harassing acts.’” The court also noted that the harassment unreasonably interfered with Harper’s work performance as she suffered migraines and nausea due to stress from the harassment, leading to a doc102
tor’s prescription for medical leave. Thus, while the court did not exexpressly invoke the subjective element of the reasonableness test, it did
find Harper’s perception of and response to the harassment to be objec103
tively reasonable. In other words, the court defined harassment in part
based on its effects on the victim—which is, in fact, already a Harris fac104
tor in the context of unreasonable interference with work. While
Harper’s case, given the repetitive nature of the harassment and its duration, could have met the severe or pervasive standard pre-#MeToo in
many courts, the district court did not appear to think it did. By granting summary judgment to the defendant, the district court showed that
not only did it believe this type of behavior was not sexual harassment,
but also no reasonable jury could deem it as such. But the Sixth Circuit’s focus on the harm the plaintiff suffered, without treating this as

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855 (quotation marks omitted).
Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
Harper, 803 F. App’x at 855.
Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856.
Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856.
See Harper, 803 F. App’x at 856. Courts often avoid discussion of the subjective evaluation since, if the objective standard is met, the subjective one likely is too. Cf.
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565-66 (8th Cir. 1992) (using
the objective reasonable person standard to reverse a district court’s holding that a
plaintiff could not have been subjectively harmed by workplace harassment that included showing her pornography since she had previously posed for nude photographs).
104. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
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part of the subjective element of reasonableness, shows how courts can
incorporate a plaintiff’s experience into the objective prong of the test.
In so doing, the Sixth Circuit demonstrates how courts can, given the
fungibility of reasonableness, evolve alongside the societal, #MeToodriven shift in understandings of what constitutes sexual harassment.
In Hernandez, the Fourth Circuit accepted smaller or less repeated
acts as significant enough to constitute a hostile work environment, and,
105
in Parker, it accepted a single rumor as sufficient. This approach may
not be novel, but taken together it is nonetheless more deferential to the
victim of harassment. While in Harper, the harassing behavior was more
regular, the Sixth Circuit’s willingness to treat lesser offenses such as
yelling, coupled with other advances, as part of a hostile work environment is also more deferential to the plaintiff than courts, including the
106
Sixth Circuit itself, have been pre-#MeToo. In light of the speed at
which social understandings of sexual harassment have evolved, that the
lower courts held that the offending conduct in these cases did not create a hostile work environment seems all the more retrograde.
Certain EEOC administrative cases have also led to reversal of
agency decisions that deny that conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive. This suggests a greater willingness by the EEOC to broaden the nature of the conduct that it deems reasonably could create a hostile work
environment. In Lida G. v. Perdue, handed down a few months after
#MeToo began, the EEOC reversed a Department of Agriculture agency review that found the activity the complainant alleged was not severe
107
or pervasive enough. The complainant, a worker in a grain inspection
unit of the Department of Agriculture, alleged that a coworker, possibly
intoxicated, asked her to sit in his lap and told her “you know you want

105. Consider again precedent across circuits for treating even repeated, physical acts as
not severe or pervasive enough. See Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs.,
394 F.3d 1098, 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining three incidents, including several inappropriate comments and instances of physical contact, over nine
months did not amount to a violation); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 98485 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a battery and two offensive remarks over six months
did not create a hostile work environment); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d
1238, 1243, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that constantly following
and staring at the plaintiff, in addition to an instance of physical contact, an inappropriate statement, and three instances of sniffing at the plaintiff—two of those times
while staring at her groin—over eleven months did not meet the necessary frequency
for a hostile work environment).
106. See, e.g., Burnett, 203 F.3d at 984 (finding that a battery and two offensive remarks
over six months did not create a hostile work environment).
107. Lida G., EEOC Appeal No. 0120160072, 2017 WL 6729150, at *3 (Dec. 14,
2017).
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it,” in addition to alleging that he had grabbed her in the past. In Lelah T. v. Brennan, the EEOC again reversed a federal agency decision on
109
reasonableness. A supervisor working for the U.S. Postal Service alleged that her manager harassed her by making advances and informing
her about his sexual libido, continuing to make sexually charged re110
marks over the course of a year. The Postal Service had found that the
alleged harassment did not meet the reasonableness standard; the EEOC
111
overruled that decision. Finally, in Erline S. v. Sessions, the EEOC
held that a supervisor who grabbed and caressed the complainant and
thereafter reacted to her with anger and a raised voice on several occasions had objectively and subjectively created a hostile environment due
112
to the pervasiveness of his actions.
A traditional view of pervasiveness (or severity, for that matter)
would not have resulted in these EEOC holdings on severe or pervasive
harassment, as repeated inappropriate comments have often not risen to
113
the traditional reasonableness standard. And overall, among the decisions courts have made regarding the reasonableness standard since the
#MeToo movement began, the above cases appear to apply a reasonableness analysis that favors the victim by treating the victim’s perceptions or reactions to the behaviors as evidence that they are harassing in
nature, and by accepting behaviors that were not traditionally understood to be egregious as legally actionable. Taken together, these cases
suggest that modern views of what constitutes sexual harassment may be
seeping in.
2. Avoidance of the Reasonableness Standard
Though some courts have seemingly incorporated the cultural shift
of the #MeToo movement into their reasonableness approach, others
have avoided the issue altogether. The First Circuit has notably sidestepped the reasonableness question while still holding for plaintiffs in
108. Lida G., 2017 WL 6729150, at *2-3.
109. Lelah T, EEOC Appeal No. 0120172533, 2020 WL 5844335, at *4, *8 (Oct. 24,
2018).
110. Lelah T., 2020 WL 5844335, at *2.
111. Lelah T., 2020 WL 5844335, at *4.
112. Erline S., EEOC Appeal No. 0120160618, 2016 WL 4771671, at *1-2, *6 (Feb. 22,
2018).
113. See, e.g., Legrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1100,
1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981, 984-85 (6th
Cir. 2000); Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 55, 58-59 (2d Cir.
2004); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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hostile work environment claims. In Franchina v. City of Providence, the
First Circuit upheld a decision for a former firefighter who was repeatedly called “cunt,” “bitch,” and “lesbo” in the workplace, was spit on
and shoved, and once had “the blood and brain matter of a suicide114
attempt victim flung at her by a member of her own team.” In addition to those offenses, one of the instigators once rubbed his nipples in
front the plaintiff; intentionally walked in on her while she was changing; and would encourage others to refer to the plaintiff, named
Franchina, as “Frangina,” a combination of her name and the word
115
“vagina.” The First Circuit upheld a finding of hostile work environ116
ment without commenting on the reasonableness test at all.
This appears to be a trend for the First Circuit. In Roy v. Correct
Care Solutions, Tara Roy, a nurse at a Maine Department of Corrections
prison, was subjected to derogatory jokes and comments—including
suggestions that a woman’s “job is to be at home”—and mistreatment
from prison guards who left her alone with inmates, repeatedly called
her a “bitch,” and made sexual advances that included sending her sex117
ually explicit text messages. Though the district court held that a reasonable jury could not determine that Roy had been subjected to a hostile work environment, the First Circuit disagreed and remanded the
case for trial, without commenting at all on the reasonableness of Roy’s
experiencing this as harassment. Instead, it offered a recitation of the
facts of the case with sparse commentary that a jury could, given those
118
facts, find that the behavior was severe or pervasive.
In Franchina, the First Circuit certainly pulled no punches: The
court chastised the defendant for “attempts to trivialize the abuse,” call119
ing it “nothing short of abhorrent.” By omitting a reasonableness
analysis without explanation, the First Circuit leaves its logic open for
interpretation, but in all likelihood, given the specific facts of these two
cases, the First Circuit saw no need to discuss the reasonableness standard in light of what the court saw as such obvious cases of sexual harassment.
While the First Circuit has found for plaintiffs in these cases, the
court’s avoidance of the reasonableness standard may leave plaintiffs
114. Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018). The court determined that the plaintiff’s claims taken together constituted a hostile work environment. Id. at 55.
115. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 39-40.
116. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 55.
117. Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2019).
118. Roy, 914 F.3d at 64.
119. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 38, 61.
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with dissimilar claims unsure of what facts, going forward, are sufficient
to win a hostile work environment claim.
C. #MeToo Backlash
Even as some courts have demonstrated a willingness to expand
their application of the reasonableness test, others have followed the opposite path, construing reasonableness more narrowly than most pre#MeToo courts. Going beyond just maintaining the pre-#MeToo approach, the Seventh Circuit’s response could even be deemed a #MeToo
120
backlash. In 2018, in Swyear v. Fare Foods Corporation, Amy Swyear,
a former sales representative, alleged a hostile work environment by
claiming that her coworkers referred to one woman customer as
121
“Cunty” and another as “Big Tittie Blonde Carnie.” On a business
trip, Swyear’s coworker repeatedly made sexual advances, insinuated
that they should skinny-dip together, touched her back, and eventually
entered her hotel room and crawled into her bed, suggesting that she
122
needed a “cuddle buddy.” Though the coworker left after Swyear’s requests that he do so, he came back to her room throughout the night
123
and knocked on her door repeatedly. When Swyear reported this behavior to a supervisor, the company determined that no discipline was
124
necessary. When evaluating the objective and subjective components
of Swyear’s hostile work environment claim, the Seventh Circuit conceded that Swyear subjectively found the environment “to be sexist and
125
offensive.” The court emphasized, however, that Swyear felt “in control of the situation,” therefore inferring her coworker’s actions “were
much less threatening and severe” than the kinds of acts the court had

120. Though the #MeToo movement has not yet experienced a more concerted form of
backlash, there have been naysayers—within the feminist movement and outside it—
who critique the outcome of #MeToo as a slippery slope toward a puritanical society
and/or one lacking (social) due process. See, e.g., Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say
#MeToo. Privately, We Have Misgivings. N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/golden-globes-metoo.html
[https://perma.cc/P5B4-V5KY]; Jia Tolentino, The Rising Pressure of the #MeToo
Backlash, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culturedesk/the-rising-pressure-of-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/G8L7-AU5D].
121. Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2018).
122. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
123. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
124. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
125. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881.
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126

found would create a hostile work environment. With respect to the
objective standard, the court determined that a reasonable person would
not find the environment hostile. It cited pre-#MeToo precedents from
127
as far back as 2002 to hold that a reasonable person should have “the
128
thick skin that comes from living in the modern world.”
Implicit in its application of a “thick skin” standard is a critique,
intentional or not, of the #MeToo movement. There is hardly a more
dismissive phrase the Seventh Circuit could have used to inform Swyear
that her perception of her treatment was unreasonable, especially given
the extreme facts of her case. The “thick skin” colloquialism chastises
the plaintiff for bringing the claim at all and evokes long-standing stereotypes of over-emotional or hyper-sensitive women—stereotypes at odds
with the changing discourse surrounding women’s allegations of sexual
129
harassment.
The Seventh Circuit’s view of the level of severity or pervasiveness
necessary to create a hostile work environment better aligns with not
only a pre-#MeToo understanding of sexual harassment but perhaps
even a pre-Harris one, where only the most egregious behavior—such as

126. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 882.
127. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881 (citing Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 463
(7th Cir. 2002)).
128. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 881 (citing Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 667 (7th
Cir. 2012)). This is far from the first time the Seventh Circuit has indicated that discrimination claims operate on a sliding scale of the victim’s sensitivities. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018)
(holding for an employer in a race discrimination case on the basis that “[w]e expect a
certain level of maturity and thick skin from employees”). The First and Fourth Circuits have also used the phrase in past decisions. See, e.g., Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc.,
229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The workplace is not a cocoon, and those who labor in it are expected to have reasonably thick skins—thick enough, at least, to survive the ordinary slings and arrows that workers routinely encounter in a hard, cold
world.”); Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 57 F.3d 1067 at *4 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (describing the Harris standard as requiring the plaintiff to
“prove her case both objectively and subjectively; standing alone, a thin skin cannot
create a case”). An unpublished decision, Webb does not have precedential value; subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions, in particular the more expansive ones post#MeToo, do not necessarily repudiate the “thick skin” standard, but appear to quietly disregard this view. See supra Section II.B.
129. The “thick skin” standard may seem at odds with the “eggshell skull” standard from
tort law—that a defendant is responsible for the entirety of the harm the plaintiff suffers, regardless of whether the plaintiff had a particular sensitivity to the harm (in
other words, you take your victim as you find him). See, e.g., Vosberg v. Putney, 50
N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). The key difference here is that the “eggshell skull” analysis allows exploration of the plaintiff’s sensitivities with respect to damages and not
as part of evaluating whether a harm occurred in the first place. Id.

146

michigan journal of gender

& law

[Vol. 28:119

the repeated rape at issue in Meritor—rises to the level of sexual harass130
ment. In 2018, in EEOC v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Seventh
Circuit upheld a jury verdict finding a hostile work environment after a
131
customer stalked a Costco employee for more than a year. The court
easily concluded that a reasonable juror could determine that being
stalked for over a year created a hostile work environment; it did not
even address the subjective reasonableness of the victim’s perception of
132
the environment. For the court, the severity of stalking, as a matter of
safety, distinguished this conduct from that of the defendant in Swyear,
in which the plaintiff was “in control,” but took offense to her cowork133
er’s behavior. The Seventh Circuit has maintained a high bar for what
constitutes a hostile environment since well before the #MeToo movement, even after the Supreme Court handed down the Harris reasonableness standard. Among the actions it has considered not severe or pervasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile work environment are: a
supervisor groping a plaintiff, otherwise touching her inappropriately,
and asking her out on dates; and a supervisor repeatedly kissing, touch134
ing, and chasing the plaintiff. And in a post-#MeToo world, it took
an egregious, widely agreed-upon form of physical unsafety for the Seventh Circuit to treat the behavior as illegal sexual harassment. In contrast, the First Circuit treated verbal sexually explicit advances alone as
135
obvious forms of sexual harassment.
The Fifth Circuit employs a similarly high threshold for what constitutes sexual harassment. Consider its 2019 decision, Gardner v. CLC
of Pascagoula, in which a nurse in an assisted living home experienced
years of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit comments from a patient
136
with dementia. A district court determined that this did not meet the

130. Recall that in Harris, the Supreme Court explained that the egregious actions in Meritor do not “mark the boundary of what is actionable.” Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc.,
510 U.S. 367, 371 (1993).
131. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 621
(7th Cir. 2018).
132. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d at 626-27.
133. Swyear, 911 F.3d at 882.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Kolesch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d
705, 709 (7th Cir. 1995); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir.
1993)) (both cases decided post-Harris but pre-Oncale).
135. See, e.g., Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018); Roy v.
Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2019).
136. Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, LLC, 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019). Though
the case involved third-party harassment from a non-employee, employers can be liable for third-party harassers, such as customers. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,
162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
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severe or pervasive standard, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
a reasonable jury could determine that the objective and subjective rea137
sonableness standards were met. The nature of the harassment—
which included multiple incidents of sexual assault via groping or sexual
grabbing—likely distinguishes this hostile work environment claim
from the allegations of repeated sexual commentary in a case like Malin.
There, the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable person would not believe
that graphic sexual commentary from a human resources manager who
138
was a woman was severe or pervasive. What might seem like a deferential decision to the plaintiff in Gardner in fact reflects a high standard
of repeated, physical, and unsafe conduct, leaving plaintiffs suffering
from sexual harassment that is verbal or not physically endangering with
no recourse. Meritorious claims in the court of public opinion, let alone
other circuits, fail merely because of the plaintiff’s misfortune of falling
within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
Why would courts excuse inappropriate commentary more readily
than overtly physical forms of sexual harassment? One probable explanation is line-drawing. Since Oncale, courts fear policing the workplace
139
and introducing the much-feared court-created “civility code.” Another explanation is the continued devaluing of emotional harms caused
by non-physical forms of sexual harassment as real harms that would affect a reasonable person. Through changing the social standards around
sexual harassment, the #MeToo movement is attempting to eliminate
these barriers and in many cases has done so; but the legal system has
not yet entirely caught up.
III. Reasonableness of the Victim in (Not) Reporting
Harassment Under the FARAGHER-ELLERTH Standard
As discussed above, the companion cases Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth gave rise to the Faragher140
Ellerth affirmative defense to sexual harassment claims. This affirmative defense allows an employer to assert that an employee was unrea141
sonable in her efforts to report the harassment. The two-pronged test
requires that the employer show it exercised reasonable care to prevent
137.
138.
139.
140.

Gardner, 915 F.3d at 327.
Malin v. Orleans Par. Commc’ns Dist., 718 F. App’x 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2018).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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and correct the harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff unreasonably
142
failed to take advantage of the employer’s corrective opportunities.
Appellate review of the second reasonableness prong of this defense
post-#MeToo has been scarce. But as discussed below in Section III.B,
the Third Circuit has made a dramatic departure from the pre-#MeToo
standard, which could pave the way for a new legal understanding of
how a victim reasonably responds to sexual harassment.
Psychologists, academics, and activists explored the reasons victims
of sexual harassment may not report their harassment long before #MeToo took hold. In 1995, psychologists Louise F. Fitzgerald and Suzanne
Swan elucidated ten strategies, based on their research, used by victims
143
dealing with harassment. They found that the external process of seeking institutional or organizational relief was by far the most infrequent
144
response to sexual harassment. In fact, Fitzgerald and Swan found that
“the least confrontational responses” were the most commonplace, while
victims would only report via formal complaints or similar actions “as a
145
last resort when all other efforts [had] failed.” Some scholars consider
sexual harassment the most pervasive form of violence against women,
146
and perhaps the most tolerated. In many if not most circumstances, it
therefore would be more reasonable to avoid an institutionalized process
than to go through one, as such a process will not result in any actual
change, or worse, might encourage retaliatory or other negative behavior
against the complainant by her harasser or even her workplace. The Faragher-Ellerth defense, then, at least in its original interpretation, places
the victim in a circular dilemma: Making a complaint could make her

142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
143. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, J.
SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 117 (detailing the research the authors conducted regarding victim behavior, as well as the ten strategies victims deployed in response to
sexual harassment).
144. Id. at 121. Some research suggests as few as 25% of women who experience sexual
harassment use a complaint procedure, within their company or with the EEOC, to
report their harassment. Lauren Edelman, How HR and Judges Made It Almost Impossible for Victims of Sexual Harassment to Win in Court, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22,
2018), hbr.org/2018/08/how-hr-and-judges-made-it-almost-impossible-for-victimsof-sexual-harassment-to-win-in-court [https://perma.cc/8T9R-WXQZ].
145. Fitzgerald & Swan, supra note 143, at 121. Considering that there is a spectrum of
responses to workplace sexual harassment, and that there is no one typical behavior,
such studies prompt the question: At what point should we deem a victim to be unreasonable?
146. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald, Still the Last Great Open Secret: Sexual Harassment
as Systemic Trauma, 18 J. TRAUMA & DISSOCIATION 483 (2017) (detailing the pervasiveness of sexual harassment against women).
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circumstances at work worse, but she is required by law to make a com147
plaint before taking steps to make her situation better.
A. Post-#MeToo, the Continuation of Pre-#MeToo Standards
Despite research indicating the typical behavior of victims, generally speaking, failure to report is fatal to a plaintiff’s case unless she can
demonstrate a reasonable fear of retaliation or similar consequences.
Failure to report the right way can also vindicate an employer’s affirma148
tive defense. In a post-#MeToo case in January 2018, the Fourth Circuit addressed the defense in a case in which a plaintiff alleged a
coworker “found her in a supply closet, closed the door, kissed her, and
while restraining her with his hands managed to undo his belt, pull his
pants down, undo [the] Plaintiff’s belt, and pull her pants down” before
149
they were interrupted. Because the plaintiff only “shared her allegation with two non-supervisory individuals” the court held that she had
150
unreasonably failed to take advantage of her company’s procedures.
The court relied on the same standard it had applied pre-#MeToo un-

147. MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 1095. A perhaps obvious solution to this dilemma, from
the perspective of a court, is to “demand less of complainants and more of employers.
Definitions of harassment should include a more expansive understanding, informed
by social science research, about what kinds of behavior interfere with workplace performance and when it is reasonable for victims to avoid internal complaint channels.”
Rhode, supra note 21, at 422. See also Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17
(2018).
148. For example, reporting too long after the fact of the sexual harassment can be fatal to
this defense. See, e.g., Jenna P., EEOC Appeal No. 0120150825, 2018 WL 1392300
(Mar. 9, 2018). In Jenna P., the complainant, an analyst for the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleged that her supervisor continually made comments about her clothing and appearance which quickly turned sexual, culminating in her supervisor exposing his penis to her and groping her, among other lewd acts. Id. at *1. The EEOC
reversed an agency holding against liability due to a Faragher-Ellerth defense. Id. at
*6. The agency determined the complainant “unreasonably delayed” reporting the
behavior, since she did not do so for almost a year. Id. at *2. The complainant argued
that she delayed reporting in order to gather tangible evidence of the harassment. Id.
at *2-3. In its decision, the EEOC focused on the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth
defense, and side-stepped the issue of the complainant’s reasonableness, but the agency’s holding nonetheless demonstrates a pervasive, anti-plaintiff attitude regarding
timing of a complaint, even post-#MeToo. Id. at *6.
149. Lacasse v. Didlake, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 3d 494, 498 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d 712 F.
App’x 231 (4th Cir. 2018).
150. Lacasse v. Didlake, Inc., 712 F. App’x 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2018).
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der which proof that an employee failed to follow a complaint proce151
dure normally fulfills this element of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have indicated that they, too,
will continue to take the same approach to this defense that they took
pre-#MeToo. In 2019, in Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit upheld a summary judgment finding for Wal-Mart after an employee, Tristana Hunt, sued for sexual harassment by her supervisor
152
Daniel Watson. Watson had been accused of sexual harassment with153
in Wal-Mart before. Prior to Hunt’s work with him, Wal-Mart had
received two complaints from a different employee regarding Watson’s
behavior, and had given him written instruction twice that he was not
154
performing up to Wal-Mart’s standards. Hunt herself also alleged re155
peated sexual harassment by Watson. When they first met, he “asked
her why she was wearing a particular shirt, saying that he could see her
breasts, and then commented that he did not understand how a woman
156
could have breasts so large despite having a small body.” A month later he made another comment about her breasts and later told her he
157
wanted to shower with her. Later still, when Hunt showed Watson a
picture of a fallen tree on her phone to explain how inclement weather
had prevented her from getting to work, he took the phone and “indicated he was looking through it for naked pictures . . . and again asked
158
when he could see her breasts.” He repeated the same advances several
159
times thereafter. Hunt eventually filed a complaint four months after
the harassment began; the store manager had Watson complete an antiharassment course in response, and Hunt did not report or subsequently
allege new instances of sexual harassment between then and filing her
160
lawsuit.
In evaluating the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense—that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent the harassing behavior—the Seventh Circuit held that “no reasonable jury could find that
151. Lacasse, 712 F. App’x at 238 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998)). Psychologists and sociologists have expressed skepticism at the efficacy of having internal anti-harassment or complaint policy/procedures on the books,
without more. See Tippett, supra note 28, at 244.
152. Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2019).
153. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
154. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
155. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
156. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
157. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
158. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
159. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626-27.
160. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 627.
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Wal-Mart acted unreasonably” because of its “comprehensive policy
that explicitly prohibited sexual harassment” and “robust” choices “for
161
reporting retaliation.” Much like the Fourth Circuit, the court treated
the adoption of an anti-harassment policy as the key factor in determin162
ing whether the employer exercised reasonable care. For the second
prong—the evaluation of the plaintiff’s reasonableness—the court
deemed the delay of four months to be unreasonable and therefore fatal
163
to Hunt’s case. In doing so, it relied on past Seventh Circuit precedent that “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s duty to alert the em164
ployer to the allegedly hostile environment.”
The significance of a defendant having an existing anti-sexual harassment policy seemed to sway the Eleventh Circuit in 2019 in Joyner v.
165
Woodspring Hotels Property Management. In that case, Dorothea Joyner, a hotel employee, alleged that a manager was spreading rumors that
166
she had been promoted due to an affair with someone higher up.
Joyner heard the rumor repeated several times and after she had been
167
terminated sent a letter to the company informing it of the behavior.
But the Eleventh Circuit focused heavily on the fact that the company
168
“had policies in place to prevent sexual harassment.” For the second
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, the court held that by failing to
report until after her termination, Joyner “failed to take full advantage”
of the reporting mechanisms available, and determined that “fear of retribution”—which Joyner alleged was her reason for not reporting until
after her termination—“is not a valid reason for failing to use a compa169
ny’s reporting procedures.”
This approach is out of step with the known behavior of victims of
sexual harassment, especially considering the rational nature of a fear of
retaliation. But unfortunately for plaintiffs, if a defendant succeeds on
the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, a court’s application of
the second prong could logically be quite favorable to the defendant.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Hunt, 931 F.3d at 630.
Hunt, 931 F.3d at 630.
Hunt, 931 F.3d at 631.
Hunt, 931 F.3d at 631 (quoting Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, 576 F.3d 629, 638 (7th
Cir. 2009)).
Joyner v. Woodspring Hotels Prop. Mgmt. LLC, 785 F. App’x 771, 774 (11th Cir.
2019).
Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 773.
Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 773.
Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 774.
Joyner, 785 F. App’x at 775.
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For instance, an EEOC case from August 2018 chastised a complainant
170
for neglecting to participate in an EEOC administrative hearing. The
complainant, a city carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, alleged sexual
harassment by a coworker, including the coworker exposing his penis to
her during a Facetime call—an incident she did not initially report—
171
and later following her to her car and jumping in. It was at this point
172
that she reported both incidents. The coworker admitted to the first,
173
but not the second, allegation. The Postal Service denied liability because it took immediate and corrective action following the plaintiff’s
174
report by separating the parties and conducting an investigation.
Though the EEOC did not explicitly refer to the Faragher-Ellerth defense, it effectively applied that defense in its analysis of both the agen175
cy’s and complainant’s actions. It agreed that the agency acted appropriately but also indirectly reprimanded the complainant for her
behavior, noting “that [the] first incident was never brought to the attention of management” and that the complainant opted not to “take
advantage of” the “opportunity to have an EEOC administrative hear176
ing.” Based on the factors the EEOC used to make its decision, a Faragher-Ellerth evaluation from this bench would have held the complainant had been unreasonable by failing to inform the Postal Service
through its established procedures so it could learn of the harassment
and take the same corrective action it later pursued.
B. The Path Toward Expansion
Despite past unfavorable treatment of plaintiffs at the second
prong of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, the Third Circuit has made a major departure from the standard approach to denying plaintiffs’ reasonableness when they do not come forward to report. In April 2018, the
Third Circuit expressly incorporated post-#MeToo understandings of
177
victims’ behavior into its decision in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County.
In particular, it noted that “a mere failure to report one’s harassment is

170. Regena L., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170416, 2018 WL 4358892, at *3 (Aug. 2,
2018).
171. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *1-2.
172. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *1-2.
173. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *2.
174. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *2.
175. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *3.
176. Regena L., 2018 WL 4358892, at *3.
177. Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018).
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not per se unreasonable” and could be motivated by the perceived “fu178
tility of reporting” said harassment. Sheri Minarsky, a part-time secretary at the Susquehanna County Department of Veterans Affairs, was
the victim of physical and non-physical sexual harassment by her supervisor, who would massage her shoulders, attempt to kiss her on the lips
at the end of the workday, touch her face, question her about her
whereabouts, call her at home on her days off, and send her sexually ex179
plicit messages from his work email. Minarsky’s employer raised the
Faragher-Ellerth defense, suggesting Minarsky did not take advantage of
180
reporting mechanisms the office had in place. In response, Minarsky
noted that, as someone depending on her employment to pay medical
bills for her ill daughter, she feared speaking up to her supervisor about
181
his harassment in case he reacted and became “nasty.” For similar rea182
sons, she feared disclosing his harassment to anyone else at her work.
In keeping with typical applications of the defense, when the lower
court examined prong two, it found that Minarsky had acted unreasonably in failing to report the harassment and granted summary judgment
183
for her employer. But noting “national news regarding a veritable firestorm of allegations of rampant sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not reported by victims,” the Third Circuit reversed, hold184
ing that this was instead a jury question. Its decision determined that
fear of speaking up could very reasonably prevent a plaintiff from re185
porting harassment.
Apart from Minarsky and the decisions discussed above that relied
on pre-#MeToo rationales, circuit courts have addressed the FaragherEllerth defense nominally, if at all, as few cases have arisen since #Me186
Too began that created the need to do so. But Minarsky offers striking
insight into the potential for #MeToo to change the legal landscape for
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Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 306-07.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 311-12.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 307.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 311.
Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12.
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The Second and Fourth Circuits have handed down other decisions in cases involving the Faragher-Ellerth defense since Minarsky, but neither court meaningfully
commented on the defense in doing so. Berrie v. Bd. of Educ. of Port Chester-Rye
Union Free Sch. Dist., 750 F. App’x 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2018) (reaching no conclusion
about a district court’s application of the defense); Nzabandora v. Rectors & Visitors
of Univ. of Virginia, 749 F. App’x 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district
court’s holding of a successful Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense).
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victims of sexual harassment. For the Third Circuit to explicitly tie its
understanding of the reasonableness of a victim’s response to harassment
to the prevalence of news coverage stemming from #MeToo shows that
#MeToo has the potential, thirty-five years after Meritor established
sexual harassment as a legal claim, to accomplish a legal recalibration of
what constitutes an appropriate expectation of victim behavior.
IV. Conclusion
There is no question that the #MeToo movement has shifted cultural norms and expectations. Theoretically, “reasonableness” is an elastic enough standard to shift with evolving perceptions of acceptable
workplace behavior and to incorporate modern understandings of what
may constitute victims’ responsive behaviors. But reasonableness is defined by its fit within the status quo; it is a reflection of the existing societal dynamic (or the dynamic of the particular jury, if a reasonableness
evaluation makes it to one). Before #MeToo, the status quo treated sexual harassment as valid only in its most brutal or shocking forms. As the
#MeToo movement begins to shift the status quo, the reasonableness
standard, despite its past failings but precisely due to its elasticity, also
creates the most room for vindication of long-mistreated claims of hostile work environments and long-existing misunderstandings of victims’
decisions not to report sexual harassment.
In the 1970s, the legal system resisted acknowledging sexual har187
assment as a form of sex discrimination at all. Just as courts expanded
the legal conception of discrimination on the basis of sex to incorporate
sexual harassment, they are capable of expanding the legal conception of
sexual harassment to incorporate a wider range of victims’ perceptions
and behaviors as reasonable. Though there is a long way to go, the
#MeToo movement has already started to make that happen.

187. See Reva Siegal, Introduction to DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 11-13
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegal, eds., Yale University Press 2004).

